<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>Attack-Surface on iamelli0t's blog</title><link>https://iamelli0t.github.io/tags/attack-surface/</link><description>Recent content in Attack-Surface on iamelli0t's blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://iamelli0t.github.io/tags/attack-surface/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>AI Agent Security Series: 1. Taking an AI Agent Apart</title><link>https://iamelli0t.github.io/ai-agent-security/01/</link><pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://iamelli0t.github.io/ai-agent-security/01/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Since 2025, mainstream coding agents have entered a period of frequent severe-vulnerability disclosures: Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, and GitHub Copilot have each produced vulnerabilities that a malicious repository can trigger remotely. In Claude Code&amp;rsquo;s CVE-2025-59536, hooks configuration shipped by a malicious repository executed before the trust dialog appeared [1]; in Codex CLI&amp;rsquo;s CVE-2025-61260, project-local MCP configuration was auto-loaded, so cloning a single repository handed over execution and the GitHub token [2]; in Cursor&amp;rsquo;s DuneSlide (CVE-2026-50548/49), the sandbox write allowlist was built from model-supplied parameters, letting injected content point the allowlist at the sandbox executor itself [4].&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>